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Bracton, the Year Books,
and the "Transformation of Elementary
Legal Ideas" in the Early Common Law
DAVID J. SEIPP

The language of the common law has a life and a logic of its own,
resilient through eight centuries of unceasing talk. Basic terms of the
lawyer's specialized vocabulary, elementary conceptual distinctions, and
modes of argument, which all go to make "thinking like a lawyer"
possible, have proved remarkably durable in the literature of the
common law. Two fundamental distinctions-between "real" and
"personal" actions and between "possessory" and "proprietary" remedies-can be traced back to their early use in treatises of the first
generations of professional common law judges and in reports of
courtroom dialogue from the first generations of professional advocates
in common law courts. Together these distinctions give the clearest
indications that the early common law professions borrowed the
vocabulary and techniques of Roman and canon law. Moreover, they
play an important role in the ongoing historical debate over English
legal concepts of property ownership.
Frederic William Maitland based his account of the origin and
working of the early common law writs on a vision of royal and feudal
courts competing in the late twelfth century for jurisdiction over
property owners and their suits about rights to land. He found in the
early royal writs some of the familiar conceptual distinctions shared
by ancient Roman and contemporary European legal systems: "real"
actions differentiated from "personal" actions, and, among the "real"
actions, interests in "property" protected by one group of writs beginning with the writ of right, and interests in "possession" protected by
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another group of writs first manifested in the assizes of novel disseisin
and mort d'ancestor.' In conceiving of feudal tenants as "owners" of
land and in making use of the Latin term proprietas to describe that
ownership,2 Maitland followed the terminology of one of his principal
sources, a treatise from the second quarter of the thirteenth century
identified as the work of Justice Henry de Bracton.3
More recently, Professor S. F C. Milsom has given us a new
understanding of the early land law writs introduced by Henry II half
a century before Bracton's time. Milsom saw the writs as attempts to
restore and regulate the seignorial relationship between lords and tenants
after the chaos of the previous reign. Neither pro-Roman nor antifeudal,
"the only intention behind writ of right, mort d'ancestor, and novel
disseisin was to make the seignorial structure work according to its
own assumptions."4 In Milsom's account, Henry II's writs eventually
destroyed the very lord-tenant relationship they were intended to restore.
The unintended result is manifest half a century later in Bracton's
vision of "seisin and right as abstract concepts, untidy versions of
possession and ownership." Bracton's rights were "good against the
world," and this can only have meant that Bracton's was "a Roman
or a modern world," not the seignorial world Henry II sought to restore.
This was, in Milsom's words, no less than a "transformation of
elementary legal ideas."'
Professor Milsom has illuminated not only the original seignorial
logic of the twelfth century but also the transformed legal world from
the thirteenth century onward. Much work remains to be done to gain
a better understanding of the new set of ideas shared by common law
practitioners in this succeeding age. In the late thirteenth century and
the first decades of the fourteenth century, a profession of advocates,
or "pleaders" made its appearance in the king's courts at Westminster.6
This new legal profession prospered and passed down its learning to
succeeding generations of apprentices in a new form of legal literature
that culminated in the Year Books, a series of reports of dialogue in
court between pleaders and the king's justices.7 In the discourse of the
Year Book pleaders, some elements of the Roman vocabulary of Bracton
and Maitland remain, while others drop out of sight. Milsom's alternative descriptions of Bracton's abstract concepts raise questions: How
"Roman" was the post-transformation world of 1300? How "modern"?
One can begin to answer some of these questions by focusing on
four words found in Roman texts and in the Year Book sources (and
in modern legal discourse). Surviving manuscripts of the Year Books
and predecessor works made very frequent use of the term "possession"
to differentiate their writs, gave a specialized and limited scope to the
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term "property," and occasionally distinguished "real" from "personal"
actions! The distinctions are fundamental ones; the categories have
long been thought obvious. Their presence has been read to mark the
emergence of a common law notion of ownership of property' Their
use in English legal literature is one measure of the extent to which
the community of English lawyers turned to Roman law for elementary
substantive distinctions, for patterns of legal reasoning, and for a
structure of legal concepts.
In legal historiography the long-standing debate about Roman influences on the English common law has borne more than its share of
hidden agendas and overt prejudices.'" Many historians saw Roman
law as an illiberal, subversive, "foreign" element, ever threatening to
invade and corrupt the indigenous purity of England's common law.
The Roman concepts demonstrably present in twelfth- and thirteenthcentury English legal materials represent (to mix two familiar metaphors
of the anti-Roman historians) a "youthful flirtation" that "operated as
a sort of prophylactic inoculation, and.., rendered the national law
immune against destructive infection."" For another school of legal
historians, however, the adoption of Roman legal concepts represented
the victory of clear thinking over confusion, the embrace of universally
valid principles.'
To its detractors Roman law embodied "absolutist" political ideas
and the centralization of power.'3 Alongside a handful of passages on
the lawmaking power of the prince, the great bulk of Roman legal
writings portrayed a system of "private" legal rules that put theoretically
unlimited power over land, goods, and subordinate persons in the
hands of a sole adult male, the paterfamilias.'" This emphasis on
individual absolute ownership pervades the fundamental organizing
principles of the Roman law texts. All actions were either real or
personal. A "real" action was a claim to ownership of a physical thing
or slave, a res, asserting that the individual claimant's relationship to
the thing was superior to that of all other claimants. A personal action,
by contrast, was a claim to enforce a pre-existing obligation owed by
a specific person. 5 "Property," proprietas or dominium, expressed the
relationship of absolute ownership enforced by the real actions. "Possession" was its counterpart, a lesser interest that could be split off
6
from ownership and protected separately.'
English lawyers in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries spoke of
"real" actions and "personal" actions, and distinguished actions for
"possession" from actions asserting another, more inclusive interest in
land and goods. If they meant what the Roman lawyers meant by such
terms, their usage would suggest that English lawyers in that age had

Law and History Review
a substantive concept of absolute property rights in land, of an individual
interest that negated all claims of other persons. It would have been
quite possible for such a concept of absolute ownership to have coexisted
with the system of common law writs these lawyers administered, even
though their writs, formulated in an earlier century, did not provide a
means to litigate directly that ultimate issue of ownership against all
the world.
Did the "transformation" of which Milsom has written give English
common lawyers a new idea of property ownership to shape the future
direction of land law development? Was their conception of the interests
they were protecting based on Roman models, or was it closer to the
seignorial relationship Milsom has posited for the twelfth century, or
was it a fresh development tied to neither set of ideas?
I seek here to answer such questions of "transformation of elementary
legal ideas" by examining the usage and context of shared legal
terminology in the Year Books and other texts of the common lawyers
from the 1270s to 1320, in the Bracton treatise composed in the 1230s
to 1250s, and in some of the Roman and canon law texts studied in
the medieval universities throughout the period. The English lawyers
whose words are recorded in the Year Books found it useful to generalize
about the writs they could employ in the royal courts and to apply
labels to their categories of writs. The chief example before them was
the developing system of canon law, for which a separate profession of
legal practitioners integrated their new learning much more closely
with Roman models. The common law pleaders, to a lesser extent than
their canonist counterparts, grouped their writs in ways that mimicked
those of the elementary Roman categories of actions.
This study of the Year Book evidence finds that the early common
lawyers did not reproduce specific Roman or canon law doctrine along
with the borrowed Roman vocabulary. It is not that they consciously
rejected Roman notions of absolute ownership and actions to establish
rights against the whole world; these first professional lawyers may
simply not have known or understood how the Roman legal texts
defined the terms they borrowed.
For all that, however, the common lawyers of 1300 did have use for
Roman vocabulary and Roman legal method. They borrowed "half,"
so to speak, of the Roman distinction between possessory and proprietary actions and found a comfortable classification of remedies
upon which to hang the labels "real" and "personal" They further
exploited the Roman and canon law "sound" of their technical vocabulary by occasionally embroidering an argument with a Roman legal
maxim, stripped of its original context. In so doing, the English legal
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profession may have been seeking an extra measure of legitimacy in
an age that venerated the ancients, or may simply have been imitating
their contemporaries practicing in the church courts. On my reading
of their surviving literature, however, the English legal profession in
the half century after Bracton found no need to push the common law
writs to Roman extremes of bare possession and absolute ownership.

Bracton and the English Institutional Tradition
The present study is set within a broader temporal context. Lawyers,
judges, and legal academics have tried many times over the centuries
to portray in a single work the whole of the common law. Beginning
with Glanvill 7 and Bracton"8 in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries;
beginning again after 1600 with John Cowell, 9 Henry Finch,2" Matthew
Hale,2 and Thomas Wood,22 and culminating in William Blackstone's
23
famous Commentaries;
then beginning once more with John Austin,24
25
T.E. Holland, and their American and Commonwealth counterparts26 these authors all borrowed their terminology and structure wholly or
partly, directly or indirectly, from a Roman scheme of classification
found in Gaius's and Justinian's Institutes. The telltale traces of
distinctions between "public" and "private"; "persons,' "things," and
"actions"; "civil" and "criminal"; "real" and "personal"; "contractual"
and "delictual"; and "possessory" and "proprietary" pervade these
treatise writers' attempts to divine the inherent "structure" of the
common law. When viewed in terms of structure and vocabulary, each
of these successive formulations bears such striking similarity to the
last, across such a vast stretch of time, that the entire enterprise appears
to establish a remarkable degree of intellectual continuity.
But the influences of these "institutional" treatises and commentaries
upon each other is just one part of the story. The larger question is
how representative or influential these vast efforts of synthesis were in
framing the ordinary discourse of lawyers and in training the minds
of new generations of lawyers, particularly on the level of categorization
and organization of legal knowledge.
The surviving legal literature of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
provides evidence of such influences. We know that near the end of
Henry II's reign, the treatise known as Glanvill opened by distinguishing
"criminal" from "civil" pleas and set forth a single introductory
juxtaposition of possessory and proprietary actions, but then applied
Roman terms only sparingly in the remainder of the text.27 In the
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extant Plea Rolls of Richard I, John, and Henry III, references to
anything like Roman "possession" of land are extremely rare.28
By contrast, Bracton's treatise on the laws and customs of the English
royal court, dating from the second quarter of the thirteenth century,
followed closely the terminology and organizing principles of Justinian's
Institutes-much more closely, it is often said, than the subject matter
warranted.29 English royal judges and their clerks were probably more
familiar with Roman and canon law in Bracton's time than ever before
or since. Before 1190, in the time of Glanvill, English students would
have had to go abroad to Paris, Bologna, or other continental universities
to receive any instruction in Roman or canon law; by the 1230s,
however, both civil and canon law instruction were well established at
Oxford, and those who embarked on legal study began with lectures
on the Institutes.3" Clerics with this background served as royal administrators and judges throughout the thirteenth century. By the end
of Edward I's reign, however, common law judges were chosen instead
from among the new profession of pleaders, whose careers typically
did not begin with university training in civil law.3"
Bracton's treatise circulated widely in the late thirteenth century, just
when an organized profession of common lawyers was taking shape.32
The treatise had its imitators in the 1280s, 33 including Britton, an
updated epitome in French, the language then replacing Latin as the
written medium for transmitting the profession's learning. Beyond
these, however, for three centuries we find no trace of fresh attempts
to put the whole of English common law into Bracton's or any other
analytical framework. The question remains whether Bracton's avowedly
Roman structure became, in any respect, the conscious or unconscious
mental structure for the succeeding generations of common lawyers
whose arguments are reported in the Year Books from the 1290s
onward.
From beginning to end, readers of Bracton were continually required
to make sense of his distinctions between civil and criminal, real and
personal, contractual and delictual, and, especially, possessory and
proprietary actions.34 The treatise placed overwhelming reliance on this
Roman terminology. After some introductory definitions, Bracton announced that the whole of the law with which the treatise proposed to
deal related either to persons or to things or to actions (pertinet vel ad
personas, vel ad res, vel ad actiones).35 Like much of the first third of
Bracton's treatise, this grand division was drawn from a contemporary
summa of Justinian's Institutes.36
The law of persons, though it had pride of place, took up a mere 4
manuscript folios, followed by 90 folios on "things." The remaining

The "Transformation of Elementary Legal Ideas"
350 folios covered only part of the projected treatment of actions,
which Bracton classified in well-known Roman terms. His "first"
classification was of actions in rem, in personam, and "mixed."" The
effect, as in Justinian's Institutes, was to repeat within the category of
actions the dichotomy already set forth between persons and things in
the first two sections of the treatise -procedure, as it were, mirroring
substance.
One seeking to define real and personal actions from the text of
Bracton's treatise would learn more about the subcategories within
these two categories of actions than about any theoretical or functional
differences between them. Personal or in personam actions included
criminal and civil actions and arose ex contractu, ex maleficio, or ex
delicto (or quasi any of these three).3" Real or in rem actions included
those founded on possession and those founded on property; those for
corporeal things and those for incorporeal rights; and those to recover
possession, to acquire possession, and to retain possession.39

A single crucial passage sets forth Bracton's version of the conceptual
difference between real and personal actions found in the Institutes.
Actions in rem were brought by one who claimed to be the owner of
a thing against the possessor, and sought the thing itself, not its price,
its value, or an equivalent thing of the same kind. The demandant in
a real action did not base the claim on any personal obligation of the
possessor to return the thing. Rather, the demandant asserted ownership
of the thing and instituted the action against whoever happened to be
in possession.4" Actions of this sort could be brought for immovable
things, said Bracton, but in an action for a movable thing-an ox or
an ass, a garment, money, or grain -the possessor was always permitted
to pay its value instead of returning the specific thing; hence, such
actions were in personam. Real actions recovered specific (immovable)
things; personal actions recovered damages or a penalty.4 Novel disseisin, in Bracton's scheme, was both personal, because it could be
brought against the disseisor for his act, and restitutory, hence real,
because it restored the land to the disseisee.4"
The more crucial distinction, the one that formed the dominant
vocabulary of exposition for most sections of the treatise, is the division
Bracton made within the category. of real actions. It was the same
distinction found in Glanvill's opening passages: between actions founded
on possession (super possessione) and on property (super proprietate).43

Of the writs that form the major subject matter of Bracton's treatise,
novel disseisin, mort d'ancestor, and cosinage were called possessory
actions; the writ of right and writs of entry were proprietary.44 In the

extensive commentary on these actions, their scope, and the procedures
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particular to each, the terms "possession" and "property" recur so
frequently that it is doubtful a reader could make much of Bracton's
treatise without a firm grasp of the difference between these terms,
gained either from other Latin texts or from the treatise itself.
In the opening passages of his treatise, Bracton interjected an attempt
to distinguish possessory and proprietary "right" (ius), something he
tried to do again at greater length in the last pages of the unfinished
work.45 In both passages, Bracton sought to explain how the proprietary
right could become separated from possession: when, for example, the
proprietas descended to the nearest heir (who might be absent or a
minor or an idiot) but, before the inheritance was taken up, a more
distant relative or a stranger put him- or herself in seisin. From such
seisin, the possessory right descended to the intruder's heirs, Bracton
wrote, as a kind of proprietary right. There were then two proprietary
rights descending through different persons, but the descendants of the
nearer heir had the "greater" proprietary right.
As Maitland said, it was "a radically un-Roman gloss" employing a
Roman vocabulary to approximate an English notion of "relative"
ownership. 6 Elsewhere, Bracton scrupulously followed Roman law as
it was then understood, for example, to delineate the physical and
mental requirements for possession; "7 to distinguish between actions
for recovering, obtaining, and retaining possession;48 and to maintain,
where possible, a strict separation between the notion of possession
49
and that of ownership.
The world and the law Bracton described had undoubtedly changed
from the seignorial relationships of Henry II's reign. Even so, Bracton's
Roman learning did not well suit the practice of his contemporaries
on the bench. 0 Within a generation after Bracton's treatise, the new
profession of common lawyers was producing a literature of its own,
using a handful of the Roman terms Bracton had applied to English
law (though much more sparingly) and using the others not at all.
Historians have occasionally taken the Year Book lawyers to task for
perpetuating Bracton's terminological difficulties, for not "talk[ing] of
English law in English terms."5' "[I]t is unfortunate" wrote Van
Caenegem, "that the terminology of 'possessory assizes' was introduced"; the early lawyers "used it improperly" in an attempt "to apply
categories and terms and concepts to legal realities for which they were
52
never intended.
This study begins at this uneasy boundary line between the language
of the law and law's "reality." I searched through the Year Books of
1292 to 1294 and 1302 to 1319 53-and many earlier legal tracts,
including Brevia Placitata,Casus Placitorum, and Novae Narrationes-
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for all French or Latin variants of the terms Bracton borrowed from
the organizational scheme of the Institutes. I focus here on those
"institutional" terms that appear with sufficient frequency to be considered part of the early Year Book lawyers' regular vocabulary: "real,"
"personal," "property" and "possession."54 The endeavor is to proceed
from the language of the post-Bracton sources, insofar as possible
without presuming modern or ancient definitions for the terms that
pleaders in royal court employed, and to draw meaning from the
contexts and relationships of the categories. The goal is to compare
the way Year Book pleaders used their distinctions between "real" and
"personal" pleas, and between writs "of possession" and writs "of
right" with the Bractonian and Roman dichotomies. 5
The Year Books reveal two sorts of classifications bearing Roman
vocabulary. One is a conceptual distinction between what might be
called "possessory right" and a more inclusive "greater right." The
other distinguished between "real" pleas for a plaintiff's specific recovery
of land and "personal" pleas for monetary compensation for a defendant's acts or defaults. Neither distinction resembles the strict conceptual
separation of actions in rem and in personam and of possession and
ownership found in Roman law. Indeed, my study concludes that the
legal profession in the early thirteenth century did not start with or
settle on any agreed system of classification. Rather, judges and pleaders
developed a form of argument using assertions about correct classification as one way of analogizing from prior experience with one writ
to new questions posed by another writ. The rhetorical practice of
placing writs in a set of mutually exclusive "categories" may have
drawn upon Roman models, but it was subordinate to a different vision
of hierarchical relationships between the writs.

Categorizing the Writs
Writs of right, novel disseisin, mort d'ancestor, debt, covenant,
trespass, and the rest-these original writs were the foundation of the
pleaders' learning56 and the lowest level of lawyerly abstraction and
categorization. The king's court had long ceased deciding these sorts
of disputes in ad hoc fashion. The first step in the typical proceeding
was now the choice of a generalized blank form writ from among those
the Chancery made available. Pleaders and justices argued not merely
about the particular litigant's writ of mort d'ancestor in the case before
them but also about that writ in the abstract, everyman's hypothetical
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writ of mort d'ancestor-the wording that set all writs of mort d'ancestor
apart from all other writs."
The repertoire of writs that the Court of Common Pleas would
accept, and the names for them, were fairly well settled in the period
of the early Year Books. 8 The generalized forms of these writs provided
a set of elements for the Year Book lawyers to distinguish and classify
in a number of ways. There were new writs and old writs, original
writs from the Chancery and judicial writs from the court, writs given
by "common law" and writs given by statute. There were writs of a
"higher" or more "solemn" character and writs of a "lower" or more
"tender" nature; along this continuum the courts fashioned a hierarchy
that determined, when a claimant had a choice of writs, which of the
writs could still be brought after the claimant had lost on another
writ. 9 And in some 260 instances in the first three decades of Year
Book reports, writs "of right" and "of possession" were contrasted with
each other and with a third category, writs "of trespass." An additional
30 or more cases put these same writs within the categories "personal"
or "real."
Pleaders and justices applied the label "of possession" most frequently
and most consistently to the writs based on descent from an ancestor
who died seised of land. The typical writs "of possession" were mort
d'ancestor, ael, besael, and cosinage. 61 Once a rule or procedure came
to be applied to one of these writs, it could readily be applied to the
rest of them, since they were all writs "of possession."6 ' Some arguments,
such as the tenant's answer that the demandant had not named the
ancestor who had actually been "last seised" of the land, became so
stereotyped by reference to the category label that some reporters would
record only "we say that this is a writ of possession and so etc." and
the opponent would respond to the standard argument.62 If an opponent
pleaded to mort d'ancestor as he would to a writ "of right" it was
sufficient to deflect his argument to respond that this was a writ "of
possession." 63 Oddly, the writ most clearly "possessory" to legal historians, novel disseisin, was rarely denoted a writ "of possession. ' 64 The
point may have been too obvious, or the learning surrounding this writ
too specialized for application to the others. Pleaders also did not
belabor the point that the original writ of right was to be listed in the
"of right" category.
The writs that posed recurring problems of classification were the
several writs of entry and formedon. Tenants' counsel would assert that
the demandants' writs were "of possession" in order to attack them
on some grounds, such as that a demandant was born before the
marriage of his or her parents. 65 Counsel would argue just as surely
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that the same writs were "of right" to challenge them on other grounds,
such as the nonage of one of the parties or the omission of an ancestor
in the demandant's chain of descent.66 Demandants' counsel would
assert the contrary label in either instance.67
The reports of such arguments do not proceed to explain a rational
basis for preferring one classification or another on the basis of the
wording of writs or of particular factual circumstances of the parties.
Most such disputes ended short of clarification, with one party or the
other backing down to try another response. Some pleaders took the
middle ground and contended that the writs were "mixed" in possession
and right.68 Despite occasional reports that Chief Justice Bereford had
declared, "I wish you to understand that no writ of entry is a writ of
right,"69 and "all writs of formedon are writs of possession,"7 pleaders
continued to insist on the labels most favorable to their clients, with
mixed results, and reached no consensus by 1319.
The Year Book pleaders sorted some thirty other writs among the
categories "of possession," "of right," and "of trespass."'" They applied
the terms most frequently to writs pertaining to parsons of churches.72
Of these, the writ of right of advowson and the writ of utrum were "of
right," darrein presentment was "of possession," and quare impedit
straddled the two categories very much like the writs of entry did
before it likewise settled down as a writ "of possession."73 Writs relating
to dower, on the other hand, played no part in the classification scheme.
Still other writs, such as the writ of customs and services, had variations
in wording
that could land them in either category or leave them
"mixed."74 Finally, there were writs in the category "of trespass" that
could dispense with many of the technical rules applied to the other
groups. The termor's remedy of quare ejecit, for example, was not "of
possession" but "of trespass," and pleaders succeeded in fitting such
writs as ravishment of ward, forfeiture of marriage, waste, conspiracy,
and account into this category as well.75 Attempts to label others, like
the writ of right of
ward and quare impedit, as writs "of trespass" met
76
with less success.
A smaller number of Year Book reports apply the classifications
"real" and "personal" to the common law writs. There is not enough
evidence to show consensus among the pleaders, but the label "real"
is used, as one might expect, for such writs as novel disseisin, cosinage,
and cessavit, 77 while among "personal" actions are counted debt,
covenant, and trespass.78 These labels accord with the classifications
legal historians have long imposed on the thirteenth-century writs. The
same cannot be said for the Year Book lawyers' description of a writ
of annuity as a "real" plea 79 or their repeated labeling of quare impedit,
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the writ so often disputed between the labels "of possession" and "of
right" as a "personal" action."
Once again, the pleaders disagreed on some writs: writs of waste and
warranty of charters are called "personal" by some pleaders and "real"
by others."' They disagreed, too, on the reasons they occasionally
recorded for categorizing a writ as real or personal. The label "personal"
could apply because only damages were recoverable and land could
not be restored,8" or because the suit involved a "chattel" that could
not descend from ancestor to heir," or, as most often seems to be the
case, because the plaintiff alleged a wrongful act "personally" carried
out by the defendant.84
Taking the Year Books of 1292 to 1319 as a whole, it is striking how
often the pleaders and justices disagreed on how to classify their writs.85
The arguments certainly suggest that important consequences flowed
from these groupings, but the pleaders neither began with nor arrived
at any consensus, even for such very common writs as entry and
formedon. New or unusual writs would occasionally stump the lawyers;
they confessed they had no notion which label should attach.86 In some
contexts, argument proceeded on the basis that the labels were mutually
exclusive; every action was either real or personal, every writ should
be purely of right or of possession or of trespass.87 At other times, the
pleaders and justices spoke of writs "mixed" in possession and right,88
or in right and trespass,89 or personal and real.90 A pleader might argue
that his writ would change from one label to another, depending on
the opponent's answer.9 ' He might argue that a particular writ could
be "of right" as to his opponent and "of possession" as to his own
side.92 A few bits of dialogue, whether the result of corrupt texts or of
exasperated counsel or reporters, end up describing writs "of right of
possession"93 and "of possession of right."94
All of this could mean that the classification of writs was still in its
initial, creative phase; or, alternatively, that it was already a bygone
practice degenerating into incoherence and disuse; or that such labels
never made any real difference to the outcome of pleading. Of these
explanations, the first is most persuasive, given the pleaders' undiminished persistence in offering arguments based on classification over the
course of three decades.95 Little was settled during thirty years of
labeling,96 as might be expected under a pleading system so well
calculated to avoid judicial rulings.97 The purpose of this study is not
to reconcile these confusing attempts at taxonomy in order to divine
some "correct" classification. Rather, it is to understand the common
lawyers' intent and purpose in using these particular category terms,
Despite the evident confusion and conflict, pleaders in the Year Books
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worked to practical and explicable ends when they argued for one
classification or another.
The Use and Sense of the Categories
The rhetorical strategies of the Year Book pleaders and the justices
in basing arguments on legal classifications should be familiar to the
modem common lawyer. If one's opponent sought to rely on a rule
from one of the "real" pleas, one could answer that the present plea
was "personal" and, therefore, a different rule must be followed because
some other "personal" action applies it.98 If one's opponent cited a
recent judgment favorable to his client's side, it was enough to say that
the judgment mentioned was in a writ "of right" and that here the
parties were in a writ "of possession."99 If one's opponent advanced an

argument that had succeeded before only in a writ "of right;' the
difference in classification alone invited the conclusion that the opposite
result should be reached in a writ "of possession."' 0'
Such arguments were premised on the mutual exclusivity of the
categories. If a writ was "of possession," then it was not "of right." All
writs "of possession" would bear greater similarity to one another than
any of them would bear to a writ "of right." In a system premised on
treating like cases alike without explaining the relevance of their
similarity to the question at hand, the argument ended there.'"' The
labels "real" "personal" "possession," "right" and "trespass" gave
Year Book lawyers a vocabulary that permitted them to manipulate
the writs more easily in larger groups. The pleaders could phrase rules,
take positions, 0and
pose hypothetical situations in terms of "all writs
2°
of possession.'
Some of the labels these pleaders used were not, however, ideally
adapted to this purpose. The words "writ of right" could refer either
to a whole category or to an individual writ within that category, as
could the words "writ of trespass." Beyond this ambiguity, the Year
Books' pairing of the terms "real" and "personal" and of "possession"
and "right" as category labels raises important questions of linguistic
preferences. Looking forward from the surviving legal literature of 1190
or 1260, it was neither necessary nor obvious that the words real,
personel, possessioun, and dreit (to take the most common of many
spellings) would be chosen over all other contenders as the fundamental
categories for common law disputes over land.
Glanvill had juxtaposed "possession" with proprietasand elsewhere
had contrasted "seisin" with "right," matching Roman term to Roman
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and native to native. °3 Bracton made much more extensive use of the
Roman vocabulary, contrasting "possession" almost exclusively with
proprietas, and confounding a distinction between "possession" and
"right" by making frequent references to "possessory right" (ius possessionis).'0 4 In the 1280s Britton rendered these words in French,
contrasting propret of land with possessioun and speaking of le dreit
possessorie."5 The Year Book reporters, however, appear to have
confined the word propret' exclusively to chattels;° 6 "property" dropped
out of the lawyers' language completely as a term to be applied to
landholding and contrasted with "possession"
Bracton's vocabulary of "real" and "personal" actions was also not
the obvious or only choice for lawyers in the late thirteenth century.
Glanvill had no comparable terms of classification. Bracton's imitators,
Britton and Fleta, both commenced with the division of actions into
real and personal,0 7 but one of the short French tracts that appeared
in the decades after the Bracton treatise, Fet Asaver opened with what
was to become a popular alternative to the real/personal vocabulary,
characterizing pleas in the royal court as either "pleas of land" or "of
trespass," or both.' 8 Modus Componendi Brevia, a companion tract
composed in Latin, included both this and the division of real and
personal actions in its opening discourse." 9 The Year Books before
1320 in fact contain many more references to "pleas of land" as a
category label than to "real" pleas. '1
In the Year Books of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries,
a newly emerging legal profession was in the process of developing its
own specialized, technical language, gradually and imperceptibly departing from laymen's usage."' Future editions of the legal manuscripts
surviving from the reign of Edward I will no doubt shed more light
on the pleaders' preference for pairing the words "real" with "personal"
and "possession" with "right" to compare writs." 2 Given the increased
attention to the received texts of statutes, 1 3 Year Book pleaders would
have had to attach some meaning to "writs of possession," if only to
reckon with the first and second Statutes of Westminster of Edward I,
both of which employed the term." ' The words "possession" and
"person" had a multitude of everyday uses in the Year Books apart
from the increasingly technical terms "writ of possession" '15 and

"personal action," but cataloguing their diverse uses in other applications
offers less insight into the terminology of classification than does close
attention to the relationships that pleaders envisioned between the writs
when they classified them.
On the relationships between "real" and "personal" pleas, the Year
Books offer fewer examples but more explanation than is found for
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writs "of possession" and "of right." A writ could be categorized as
"personal" because it ended in damages, because it disputed rights to
a chattel, or, most commonly, because it accused the defendant of
committing a personal act of wrongdoing." 6 The first explanation
focused, as did Bracton, on the nature of the remedy available; the
second represented a further step toward the developing distinction
between movable, devisable "personalty" and immovable, heritable
"realty"; and the third rooted "personal" actions in a notion like the
original Roman one, that the defendant's act gave rise to an obligation
to the plaintiff. Writs might be "real" on one basis and "personal" on
another. "7
On whichever basis the Year Book pleaders constructed their "real"
and "personal" categories, they used them to conform the procedures
of all "personal" actions to one standard and all "real" actions to
another. In general, pleaders argued that a writ was "real" to take
advantage of old procedural safeguards and to allow a defendant to
put off answering until other potential parties were brought into the
proceeding. They argued that a writ was "personal" in order to require
the defendant to answer to his or her own act at once without delays,
excuses, quibbles, or the assistance of other potential parties." 8
Running counter to this tendency, and counter to the whole idea of
mutually exclusive real and personal actions, was the willingness of
pleaders to bend writs to new purposes. They would commonly use
writs about "personal" actions of particular defendants-about taking
of beasts, acts of waste to land, wardship of heirs and heiresses-in
order to litigate issues of entitlement to land. Clever pleaders could
gain the procedural advantages of "personal" actions for their plaintiffs,
then raise the stakes and force the defendants to justify their acts by
establishing their entitlement to disputed land.' Such stratagems,
which were to become familiar in the development of the common
law, helped break down any sharp conceptual separation between "real"
and "personal" actions.
Writs "of possession" and "of right" show a similar tension between
sharp categorization and strategic flexibility. While the pleaders reached
no consensus and offered little explanation of the basis for classifying
some writs "of possession" and others "of right," there does emerge
most clearly from the Year Books a common understanding that each
writ occupied a position relative to the others on a continuum from
"lowest" to "highest." Pleaders and justices employed this hierarchy of
writs with practical effect, determining in the many instances in which
demandants had a choice of writs whether a loss with one writ precluded
the demandant from bringing a new action with another. 2 ° Judgment

Law and History Review
on a "lower" writ had no res judicata effect in a writ of a "higher"
nature, which proceeded on a more formal 12basis and could raise factual
issues reaching back further into the past. '
It is possible to translate much of the dialogue about writs of
possession and writs of right in the Year Books into statements about
the relative position of writs on this continuum. A particular writ might
be said to be "of right" when compared with a writ lower on the res
judicata ladder,'22 but would be called "of possession" if the speaker
had in mind its relation to a writ higher on the same scale.' 23 Writs of
trespass were the lowest on the scale. 2 '
The mental image or "structure" that best fits the context of Year
Book references to writs "of possession," "of right" and "of trespass"
is a smooth vertical continuum indicating which writs decided or
foreclosed relatively less for res judicata purposes and which foreclosed
more.'25 If a demandant sought to support a writ by raising an issue
(such as the tenant's legitimacy) that would give the demandant
judgment in any writ that could be brought, the tenant could reply
that the demandant ought not be heard to plead "in the right" when
the writ was only one "of possession."' 26 The demandant tried, in
essence, to raise the stakes and might, if successful, bar the tenant from
countersuit not only on this writ and "lower" writs but on all "higher"
writs as well. On the other hand, if a tenant raised an issue that would
defeat a claim "on the possession," the demandant could argue that in
his situation he could have no other writ and, thus, that the one he
had must be his highest -therefore, a writ "of right."' 27
But the labels were clumsy proxies for talk about "higher" and
"lower" writs.'28 Two very different structures were in competition:
one a continuum of higher and lower writs, and the other a sharp
separation of all "writs of possession" from all "writs of right." There
was some appeal to the notion that each writ could be classified, once
and for all, as one thing or the other, so that writs within each category
could share more or less the same rules.' 29 Pleaders' "arguments from
categories" tended to produce greater similarity among all writs within
a category and greater differences between categories. 3 ° Throughout
the Year Books I studied, this subsidiary notion of disjunctive, coordinate categories of writs remained in tension with the more usual and
more effective notion of a hierarchy of writs.
The terms the pleaders attached to their categories tended to move
the paradigms to the extremes and to exacerbate this tension with the
dominant hierarchy. The "right" in a Christian world, suggested a
single correct and universally valid result.' 3 ' To "settle the right" was
not just to decide a claim that was relatively "higher" than another
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claim -it gave the impression that a judgment was rendered for always
and for everyone.' 32 In embracing the word "possession" for another
of their categories, pleaders used a label to which Bracton, with an eye
to the Roman law and its contemporary exponents, had already attached
a great deal of learning. The hierarchical structure of relationships
between the writs remained the more useful one, but when the Year
Book lawyers spoke of writs "of possession" or of "real" and "personal
actions," this usage squarely poses the question of deliberate and
conscious borrowing from Roman concepts of the division of actions.

Roman Legal Categories in the Year Books
Roman Substance in the Year Books
The elementary Roman distinction between actions in rem and in
personam opened the treatment of actions in the fourth book of
Justinian's Institutes.'3 3 In an action in rem, the plaintiff asserted a
claim to take control of a physical thing, no matter who currently
possessed it. The claim was not conceived as enforcing an obligation
owed by the current possessor to the plaintiff. The defendant in a real
action was mentioned only incidentally in the plaintiff's formula and
could withdraw entirely by abandoning the thing in dispute. In an
action in personam, by contrast, the plaintiff asserted a claim against
the defendant's "person" and conceived it as an obligation the defendant
must perform, arising from a debt or the commission of a wrong. 34
This distinction among actions, elaborated by the Roman jurists of
the early third century A.D., was not based on a difference in the
remedies afforded by the actions. A second classification that followed
this one in Justinian's Institutes focused on remedies: some actions
were "restorative," seeking recovery of a specific thing; others were
"penal" seeking damages that might be one, two, three, or four times
the plaintiff's loss.' 35 In the Roman scheme, all real actions and some
personal actions were restorative; other personal actions were penal or
were "mixed," both restorative and penal.'36

Already by the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., legal texts from the
Western Roman Empire had lost sight of the classical jurists' formulation
of the real/personal distinction and had begun substituting this second
distinction for it. Actions for money damages were called "personal,"
and actions for recovery of a thing "real"' 37 In 533 the compilers of
Justinian's Corpus Iuris revived the classical jurists' terminology of real
and personal actions distinguished by their cause-ownership or ob-
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ligation-rather than their remedy- specific land and chattels or
money compensation.'38 Civil lawyers trained in the medieval universities took Justinian's statement of the classical distinction between
actions in rem and in personam, and began to transform it into the
modern civilian distinction between substantive "rights": absolute rights
in rem against the entire world and rights in personam arising out of
relationships with specific individuals.'39
Surviving manuscripts of Bracton's treatise omitted the words of the
Institutes that explained how the classification of real and personal
actions differed from the classification of penal and restitutive actions.'40
Elsewhere, Bracton ran the two distinctions together, as late Roman
and Germanic legal texts had done, ending with "real" actions for
restoring specific things and "personal" actions for seeking monetary
damages and penalties." ' The Year Book lawyers likewise made the
easy equation of personal actions with money damages and real actions
with recovery of land or rights in land.' 42 Their categorization of writs
in these terms cannot be said to reproduce the content of the Roman
distinction. The Roman idea of a real action as a claim "against a
thing" that establishes the plaintiff's superior right to the thing over
all other persons, that presumes no obligation of the possessor to convey
the thing to the plaintiff, and that may indeed proceed without the
possessor, is absent from the Year Book dialogues. The "real" pleas
contrasted with "personal" pleas in the Year Books do not exhibit the
absolute character of the Roman actions in rem.
The proposition that classical Roman law also distinguished between
possession and ownership, and between possessory and proprietary
actions, is elementary and undisputed,' 43 but is not so easily drawn
from the Institutes. The problem of determining what "possession"
and "ownership" might have meant in preclassical, classical, and more
recent times has produced an enormous literature.""' This study ventures
nowhere near the complexities of that subject. Suffice to say, for purposes
of discussing the language of the early common law of England, that
the Roman distinction had emerged by the end of the Republican
era, 45 receded from view in the West during the fourth and fifth
centuries,' 46 and then was revived in somewhat altered form in Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis.141
In simplest terms, a medieval student could learn from Justinian's
Institutes that litigants could use the interdict uti possidetis to retain
or recover possession of land from someone with a relatively weaker
claim, or the real action vindicatio to prove ownership not only against
a possessor but against all third parties.' 48 The student might then
gather from Justinian's Digest or one of the summaries then in
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circulation that the interdict remedy was provided because possession
must be kept separate from ownership;' 49 that bringing an unsuccessful
interdict did not foreclose the claimant from later bringing a vindicatio
action, because in the interdict it is possession that is in issue, whereas
in the action it is ownership;' 50 and, conversely, that instituting a
vindicatio for land would not preclude resort to the interdict uti
possidetis, for again the Digest stated that ownership has nothing in
common with possession. 5 ' The Roman law exemplified not a manylayered hierarchy but a disjunction of actions, premised on complete
separation of these concepts of possession and proprietary right.
The schools of Roman law that flourished at Bologna and spread
throughout Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries based their
reconstruction of Roman legal science on distinctions such as this
one. "52
' Pithy, epigrammatic passages from the Digest on the strict
separation between possessio and proprietas were just the sort the
medieval glossators cherished. Once separated, the two could be contrasted: proprietas to be sought in a claim to ownership maintained
against anyone who happened to be in possession; possessio to be
sought in a relative claim to restoration brought by one recently
dispossessed against the intruder.
The Church embraced the possessory/proprietary distinction in devising canon law actions for restoration of church property and revenue,
and of marital rights.'53 Beginning in the late twelfth century, canon
lawyers extended the Roman idea of possessory actions in several
respects.' 54 Whereas the Roman interdict was brought by one dispossessed against the dispossessor, the canonists' "possessory" action could
be based on the possession of the plaintiff's predecessor in right and
brought against one who took from the dispossessor.'
Like the canonists, Bracton applied the possessory/proprietary vocabulary to the English writs and repeated many of the Roman
definitions and refinements.'56 Bracton twice penned the Digest's nihil
commune habet possessio cum proprietate, though with qualifications
of his own.' 57 In transplanting this distinction to the law of the English
royal courts, Bracton had to take labels devised for the strict separation
of the vindicatio and uti possidetis and apply them to a continuum of
relatively lower and higher actions.'
Like the canonists, Bracton
extended his notion of possession to cover descendants of a prior
possessor claiming against takers from and descendants of the person
who dispossessed the prior possessor. Bracton's solution, expressed
many times over in the treatise, was the separation of possessory and
proprietary right (ius). Possessory right was possession, or descent from
an ancestor who had died seised; proprietary right was the "mere," or
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pure, right of inheritance through an ancestor who had not died
seised.' 59 Writs such as mort d'ancestor decided only the question of
possession or possessory right; the writ of right decided both rights, or,
as Bracton added in French, dreit dreit.6 °
The Year Books for the most part drop any mention of Bracton's
separate "proprietary right." '' The term propret' is missing altogether
from discussions of land and appears only infrequently in regard to
chattels, despite Bracton's incessant use of the Latin equivalent and
the frequent references to a dreit de propret' in Britton's French
abridgment of the treatise. 6 ' Instead, the pleaders spoke simply of
"right," the right decided by the writ of right, the interest that Bracton
and Britton had called the double dreit dreit of possessory and proprietary right. None of the writs decided solely this question of the
"pure" proprietary right, and no doubt it was simpler to conceive of
the writ of right deciding one thing rather than two. "Possession" and
"right" were ways of saying "less" and "more," or "part" and "all."
When viewed in relation to Bracton's and Britton's more complex
terminology, the Year Books can be seen to depart from the full Roman
distinction and to break the connection with much of the Roman
baggage Bracton attached to the labels, including the insistence on a
strict separation between possessio and proprietas.In the English writs
possession, ownership, and right could not be kept separate.'63
By borrowing "half" of the Roman possessory/proprietary distinction, the common lawyers came to share another legal term of art with
the scholars of Roman law, but their application of the word "possession" in the Year Books, like their use of "real" and "personal'"
departed substantially from the dictates of the Roman texts. For
example, Bracton and the Romans carefully distinguished corporeal
and incorporeal things; incorporeal things, such as obligations, servitudes, advowsons, and the like, could not be possessed (they could only
be "quasi-possessed").' 64 The Year Book pleaders, if anything, went
further than the civilians and canonists not only in reifying intangible
"things" but in objectifying their "possession." Though one passage in
an early Year Book report seems to have echoed Bracton's idea that
the incorporeal could not be possessed,'65 the Year Books elsewhere
abound with references to "possession" of advowsons, services, homage,
and debts, as well as of wards and villeins.'66 If there was a writ
determining the "right" to some incorporeal thing, then what a "lower"
writ determined was its "possession."
The structure of legal remedies and the underlying structure of
human relations that emerge from the words and arguments of the
Year Books show fundamental departures from the model of Roman
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law. Possession and right were abstract concepts that the common
lawyers could manipulate at a fairly high level of generalization, yet
the relationship between writs "of possession" and writs "of right" was
not the same as the civilians' distinction between possessio and proprietas. It was a relationship of a very different kind, a pairing of
comparative terms for writs, viewed either along a continuum of "lower"
and "higher" writs or in two boxes labeled "less" and "more." In
similar fashion, the Year Book lawyers lacked any counterpart to a
Roman "real" action, and so made the easy equation of "real" with
the remedy of specific recovery and "personal" with remedies of
monetary compensation or penalties.
The Year Book pleaders' categorization of their writs as writs of
possession, right, and trespass, and as real and personal actions, thus
did not reproduce the Roman classification of actions nor transplant
the substance of Roman legal concepts. Their substantive distinctions
bear closer resemblance to those the canon lawyers applied under the
same terms.' 67 But this did not foreclose later generations of lawyers
from reading the Year Book classifications in senses closer to what a
Roman lawyer would have understood.
Roman Style in the Year Books
English common lawyers speaking, writing, and reading the words
of the Year Books did not use these terms from Roman law to reflect
or adapt Roman legal doctrine. Yet, their usage was more than an
unintentional blunder or coincidence of shared vocabulary. Terms such
as "possession," "action," "real," and "personal" helped link pleaders
and justices in the English royal courts to a well-stocked arsenal of
sophisticated argumentation and of disembodied fragments for authoritative pronouncement. To take one example, the Year Books make
almost no mention of real or personal "writs" (brefs). What they called
"personal" or "sounding in the realty" were sometimes "pleas,' but
more often "actions." The word "action" was often used, in context,
to refer to what later English lawyers called a "cause of action,"
considered independently of the written document that commenced a
particular court proceeding. For a defendant to take exception to the
"writ" might delay the suit while the plaintiff purchased a better worded
writ, but if the defendant's exception went to the "action," the argument
was that the plaintiff should be foreclosed from suing further on that
ground by any writ.'68 When using their legal vocabulary in this way,
the Year Book lawyers appeared to share with the Roman jurists a
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term by which they distinguished the basis or nature of the plaintiff's
legal claim from the verbal formula that initiated a court proceeding.
At a more superficial level, by calling their actions "real" and
"personal," English common lawyers might have evoked in their
audience-who may have comprised apprentices, attorneys, clients,
and bystanders-an impression that the mysteries practiced in the
Common Bench shared a common grounding with the legal acumen
of the revered ancients. If men of affairs in the early fourteenth century
had any acquaintance at all with the Corpus Iuris Civilis, perhaps from
a season of university study, it is reasonable to suppose that they might
have known that the Institutes, the first and most elementary of the
texts and the most widely circulated in summary form, was organized
on the principle that all law vel ad personas pertinet vel ad res vel ad
actiones.'69
A number of passages in the Year Books suggest that pleaders were
aware that in writs concerning "possession," the legal lore of Bracton
and the Romans could be deployed to advantage. In half a dozen
reports in the course of two decades, the reporters (and, it is tempting
to think, the speakers) switched from French to Latin in midsentence
to voice one or another "maxim" relating to possession. In four
instances, the Year Books report that Chief Justice Bereford or one of
the pleaders argued melior est condicio possidentis quam petentis.'7 °
That the condition of a possessor should be preferred over that of a
claimant (under one set of circumstances or another) was a formula
familiar to medieval civilians and canonists alike. Similar language
could be found in the Digest's final and most popular title, de diuersis
regulae iuris,'7' elsewhere in the Corpus Iuris Civilis,1' and among the
maxims collected in the Liber Sextus of Pope Boniface VIII.'" Glanvill
used identical language to evade an open question of inheritance
between the uncle and the grandchild, and Bracton used it to favor
the bastard in possession over the bastard who was out.'74 The contexts
of the Year Book discussions were two vexed and peculiarly English
questions: inheritance by one born before the marriage of one's parents,'" and inheritance by a stepsister from her stepbrother.'76 To these
particular issues the Roman texts had no application, but the Latin
words were ones that must have seemed, even in 1302, to have rung
down through the ages.' 77
Invocations of Roman authority could be more explicit than this.
In 1307, on a writ of cosinage, Justice Hervey de Staunton is reported
to have rebuked the demandant's pleader with the words "you are a
lawyer (legister), and there is a 'written law' which speaks of this matter,
cogi possessorem re."' 78 Legister connoted familiarity with civil or
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canon law, and "written law" had long meant the law of the Romans.' 79
Staunton's citation (the editor does not identify it) is presumably to a
passage in Justinian's Code, one that Bracton also cited as "C. de
heredibus1. cogi possessorem"'8 ° The Roman text pronounced it unjust
to compel a possessor to disclose his title to anyone who demands it,
except to make him say whether he holds the property as possessor or
as heir. Staunton applied the rule in a similar fashion to place the
burden on the demandant to show her title, and not force the tenant
in possession to produce his own.
The next glimpse of this maxim comes in 13 12, when Walter de
Friskeney, apparently speaking for a demandant in novel disseisin,
claimed that the "law demands" coge possessorem dicere suum titulum. "'8 It was a rather drastic abridgment of the Roman text, or perhaps
merely an expansion of the Roman citation, seemingly intended to
make precisely the opposite point and force the tenant in possession
to disclose his title. After these Latin words appear in the Year Book
account, Friskeney's opponent is reported to have abandoned his point
and shifted to another defense.
In the end, "they went out to imparl
82
and did not come back.'
Another exchange in 13 13 suggests again the rhetorical power of
appeals to "Roman" learning. Justice William Inge invoked the "imperial law (lei imperiale)upon which the law of the land was founded"
for another "maxim," possessiofratrisfacit sororem heredem, a wholly
English rule of succession here applied to favor the claim of a stepsister
to inherit the father's estate from her stepbrother over the claim of an
uncle "of the whole blood" 83 The words provoked two responses.
John Denham replied for the uncle that while this "imperial law"
spoke wholly of the right, he was pleading wholly on the possession of
the brother and, therefore, the rule did not apply. 84 Chief Justice
Bereford, however, swore (Nom de Dieu) that there was no such rule
85
at common law and that the common law would not be changed.
No outcome was recorded.
Roman law did permit succession by the half blood, but on an
entirely different basis'86 and without, so far as I could trace, any
mention of possessio fratris. Bracton's treatise contradicted itself on
the preference for stepbrothers over sisters of the whole blood, and did
not address the precise point contested by Inge and Bereford.' 87 Of the
widely available sources, only Britton made Inge's point-and he did
not use the Latin tag.'88 As a maxim, possessio fratris appears to have
been a new invention when Inge lent it the venerable status of "imperial
law."
Pleaders and justices of the early Year Books thus showed their
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awareness of Roman law; they drew upon it as a source for their own
professional lore. These few instances of Roman legal maxims on
"possession," wrenched from their original context and stripped of their
original content, or misquoted, or made up out of whole cloth, are but
the most direct evidence of efforts by the common lawyers to "sound
Roman."189 Civilians and canonists of the same period made much
more extensive use of Roman legal texts, of course, but with the same
free disregard of context. The Year Book lawyers-by classifying writs
into a few broad, mutually exclusive categories; by arguing on the basis
of such categories to apply rules from one writ to another; and by
using the terms "personal action," "real action," and "writ of possession"
to label these categories -consciously or unconsciously assimilated
their fledgling legal expertise to ancient Roman models and the techniques of the civilians and canonists who made formal study of them.
It would have been difficult, as Professor Plucknett pointed out, for
Glanvill and Bracton to write about law in Latin without using the
ready-made technical vocabulary of the Roman jurists. 9oWhen French
replaced Latin as the medium of professional communication, the
pleaders' language continued to echo some of the Roman terms applied
by Bracton, and continued to mimic styles of argument and thought
that Roman jurists and their medieval interpreters had made synonymous with law.
Turning from the close quarters of Westminster Hall, it is well to
recall the place of Roman law in the medieval university. To scholars
embarking on the study of Roman law in the twelfth century and after,
the Corpus Iuris embodied the perfect conception of law. It was
complete, seemingly capable of answering every conceivable question;
it was elegant, written with a sophistication of reasoning and expression
that could no longer be attained; and it was authoritative, bearing the
stamp of the good Christian emperor Justinian. 9 ' The "institutional"
scheme of categories provided medieval lawyers with a perfect structure
for this perfect body of legal materials. The civilians had only the text;
they could not know Roman law as it was practiced, nor discern its
historical development, nor share the unspoken assumptions that the
classical jurists held.'92 Law was a text of unquestioned legitimacy, but
people had lost the ability to comprehend it. Their daunting intellectual
task in the university was to range through the vast bulk of Justinian's
text and to rediscover what they believed to be the inherent consistency
and logic of those disparate materials. In the popular phrase of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, learned men saw themselves as dwarves
perched on the shoulders of giants."'
The typical pleaders in the English royal court were not university-
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trained civilians; 94 they were practitioners, not teachers, engaged in
the very different enterprise of developing pleading strategies to advance
their clients' interests, to enhance their individual reputations, and to
ensure their profession's survival. Even so, their Year Books acknowledged the existence of Roman law, its intellectual merits, and its
usefulness in argument. They thus owed some part of their success as
a profession to their ability and willingness to imitate civil and canon
law practitioners by constructing abstract distinctions and quoting the
occasional maxim. While the Year Book classifications of "writs of
possession," "writs of right," "real actions" and "personal actions" did
not carry over the substantive content of the Roman legal distinction,
they did draw upon the methods of civilians and their Roman sources.
The Roman influence did not merely act "as a cathartic on men's
minds, sweeping away much confused and archaic thinking;"' 95 it
substituted a particular type of rationality, a method of legal reasoning
that is traceable in the Year Books.'9 6 Like the civilians, the common
lawyers showed they could classify their actions on the basis of
substantive distinctions, use their classification to analogize from one
action to another, and, more fundamentally, administer a system in
which disputes could be resolved by appeal to "rules" formulated in
terms as broad and abstract as the categories they devised. It is beyond
the scope of this study to judge how far the early common lawyers
resembled the civilians in treating their own "law" as an authoritative
body of logical and consistent rules that existed in some ideal sense
beyond present human understanding and that could be "discovered"
piecemeal through intellectual effort by trained experts.
Some Concluding Notes
The Year Books began more than a century after the court of Henry
II standardized the writ of right and the assizes of novel disseisin and
mort d'ancestor in the late twelfth century. It is doubtful they can
reflect forward to the present day any new light from that earlier
period-or illuminate further the mid-thirteenth-century "transformation of elementary legal ideas" that, in Professor Milsom's account,
drew it to a close. Too little is known about the common law in the
age of Glanvill and Bracton. But as long as legal historians continue
to apply the terminology of real and personal actions to the writs, as
long as they continue to debate whether the Roman distinction between
possessory and proprietary actions lay at the origin of the fundamental
land law writs (and there is no sign the debate is stopping), the

Law and History Review
unparalleled source material of 1290 and afterward will provide a
useful reflection of that later age and of the sense professional lawyers
made of the writs in practice.
The language of the Year Books offers a glimpse of the structure of
legal ideas shared by those who made their living from contesting the
common law writs. If, as this study assumes, fundamental relationships
among the oldest and most important common law writs formed a set
of mental conceptions of deep and lasting significance, the absence of
Roman substance in the pleaders' categories of "real actions," "personal
actions," "writs of possession," and "writ of right" in the early Year
Books adds indirect support to Milsom's explanation that Roman legal
notions of absolute ownership and possession did not dwell at the heart
of the English writ system from the time of Henry II. Certainly such
notions did not survive unscathed among the lawyers of Edward II's
time. More likely, Bracton's Roman framework for the English writs
and the interests those writs protected was, half a century after their
introduction, overlaid on the writs by the treatise author and a
generation of Roman-trained clerks and justices.
The pleaders and justices of 1300 made of their writs a simpler
system than the one Bracton assembled from Justinian's Institutes.
What use they made of Roman law was superficial and imitated far
more of the vocabulary and style of the civilians than of substantive
Roman law principles. For a system of oral pleading in which fundamental points could long remain unresolved, this connection may have
given reassurance, in the face of such uncertainty, that resort could
ultimately be made to the fixed rules of the Romans. For a new
profession of pleaders who were making up a good bit of their substantive
expertise as they went along, hearkening back to Roman models of
lawyerly sophistication may also have enhanced the legitimacy of their
role.
The Year Book pleaders did inherit a world in which elementary
ideas of law had been transformed. The remedies they routinely
administered had become "actions," abstract and generalized, brought
by "one Adam" against an equally faceless and placeless defendant,
neither lord nor tenant nor stranger. This way of speaking about the
writs took them out of the social context that had made sense of them
when they were extraordinary royal interventions in seignorial landholding arrangements a century before. But the "right" of which English
pleaders spoke in the early 1300s was far from both the Roman
proprietas and "that sole and despotic dominion" Blackstone proclaimed "over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of
the rights of any other individual in the universe."' 97
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The structure that emerges from the Year Book categories is one that
dispensed with any need for a word or a concept for "property" in
land separate from "possession" and the all-inclusive "right." The Year
Book pleaders had available to them the term proprietas or propret,
which Bracton and Britton so often paired with "possession," but they
settled upon a quite different pairing of "possession" and "right" to
distinguish their land law actions. Even so, by using one term from
the Roman pairing, the Year Book pleaders left an invitation for future
lawyers to "understand" that the Roman possessio, and its obvious
counterpart proprietas,gave meaning to the common law actions. 98
In the same way, talk about "real" and "personal" actions in the
Year Books departed from the Roman concepts of actions and rights
"against the world" contrasted with rights against a specific person.
From a Roman standpoint, all the English actions were "personal,"
relative actions, just as all the protected interests in land were "possessory" to one degree or another. English common lawyers, however,
kept both the term "real" and the term "personal" in their professional
jargon and filled the pair of labels with new meanings as time went
on.

Future generations, looking for substance where the early common
lawyers had sought only style and a bit of enhanced legitimacy, could
thereby restore the missing terms of these classical dichotomies more
easily and "find" notions of absolute property implicit in the language
of the common law. Words and ways of thought, originally borrowed
for an immediate advantage in pleading, persisted, became entrenched,
and ultimately worked to set limits on the future discourse of the
profession. But the law is a living language, and it is no criticism of
the Year Book pleaders that they unintentionally created the potential
for confusion when they borrowed a few Roman terms for reasoning
about English law.
I have examined two aspects of the Roman structure that Bracton
and Glanvill adapted for the common law, those for which the same
terms were commonly used in the Year Books of the succeeding age.
The Year Book categories of "possession" and "right" represented a
substantial departure from Bracton's "possessory" and "proprietary"
actions and from his Roman model. The pleaders did not apply the
Roman distinction, perhaps because the relationship between the writ
of right and the assizes of mort d'ancestor and novel disseisin was too
close to the heart of the pleaders' practical enterprise to be recast.
At a higher level of classification, where the pleaders might have felt
less was at stake in immediate practical terms, the opportunity was
there to set up tight categories of real and personal actions along the
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lines of the Roman dichotomy. But again, the pleaders kept crossing
their own category lines and managing to make "personal" actions,
however defined, reach results that by their lights were "real" They
refused to be blinkered by rigid systems of classification, and instead
treated the writs that made up their intellectual system as manipulable,
protean tools for achieving quite diverse private ends. The intellectual
scheme of the early common lawyers certainly operated within restraints, but its restraints were not those of the Roman legal categories.
The legal profession set the terms of its discourse, and among its
unspoken premises were many shared preconceptions about law, right,
and fairness. The process of reconstructing that shared world of ideas
is problematic, but it can shed light on the most fundamental and
enduring elements of our legal tradition. What is missing from the
basic grammar of early common law discourse is as important as what
is found there. The first English common lawyers did not hark back
to the world of intimate, individual seignorial relationships, nor did
they accept the ready-made world of Roman property owners, formally
equal, with absolute claims against the world. Theirs was a world of
abstract but not absolute rights, of comparative advantage rather than
exclusive entitlement. Property, as we now understand it, was not an
idea that the lawyers required to make sense of their common law.
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next argument. See also Scaldeford v. Vaudey, Y.B. Mich. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 3, 22 S.S. 30
(1310) (entry ad terminum qui praeteriit).
70. Haselholt v. Haselholt, Y.B. Pasch. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 19, 26 S.S. 171 (1311) (formedon
in the reverter); also Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 81, 17 S.S. 159 (1308-1309) (same); but
see Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 25, 17 S.S. 79 (1308-1309) (formedon in the descender
"of right" per Bereford C.J.); Langeton v. Workeslegh, Y.B. Trin. 12 Edw. 2, pl. 21, 81
S.S. 101 (1319) (same).
71. Many of these characterizations are discussed in Milsom, Commentary on the
Actions, in NOVAE NARRATIONES, 80 S.S. xxxi-ccxiv.
72. It it possible that these were the first writs to be juxtaposed in terms of "right"
and "possession.' See infra note 120. The rare appearances of the word "possession"
in legal records of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries are nearly all in the
context of ecclesiastical matters. See supra note 28. Writs of right of advowson claimed
the right to present a parson. Darrein presentment asserted that the claimant or his
ancestor presented the last parson and that the church was now vacant. Quare impedit
sought to require a bishop or other person to permit the claimant to present a parson
to a church that had come within the claimant's gift. Utrum was a writ by which
parsons asserted that land was held by their church for spiritual services and was not
a lay fee.
73. Of the 35 such reports in the Year Books, see, e.g., Hothwait v. Courtenay, Y.B.
Mich. 9 Edw. 2, pl. 2, 45 S.S. 2 (1315) (writ of right of advowson); Parson of Meppershall
v. Prior of Chicksands, Y.B. Mich. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 19, 34 S.S. 70 (1312-1313) (utrum);
Prior of Dudley v. Bishop of Worcester, Hereford Eyre, YB. 20 Edw. 1, R.S. 205 (1292)
(darrein presentment); Adeleye v. Prior of St. John, Shropshire Eyre, Y.B. 20 Edw. 1,
R.S. 281 (1292) (quare impedit); Bernake v. Montalt, Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. IA, 20
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S.S. 58 (1310) (same); R. v. Prior of Worksop, Y.B. Hil. 10 Edw. 2, pl. 26, 54 S.S. 74
(1317) (same); Monthermer v. Prior of St. John, Y.B. Trin. 12 Edw. 2, pl. 12, 81 S.S.
78 (1319) (same). The muddled Mirror of Justices, which may date from this period,
listed utrum among the possessory pleas; THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES ch. 25, 7 S.S. 65
(WJ. Whittaker ed. 1895).
74. Bardolfv. Prioress of B., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 57, 17 S.S. 115 (1308-1309) (customs
& services); Villeins of Ewell v. Prior of Merton, Y.B. Pasch. 8 Edw. 2, pl. 17, 41 S.S.
144 (1315) (monstraverunt); Burnhill v. Ringtherose, Y.B. Trin. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 30A, 20
S.S. 200 (1310) (suit of mill); Alwarthorpe v. Abbot of Fountains, Y.B. Mich. 12 Edw.
2, pl. 79, 65 S.S. 167 (1318) (quod permittat of pasture).
75. Hertford v. Percy, YB. Mich. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 64, 34 S.S. 222 (1312-1313) (quare
ejecit); Anon., Middlesex Eyre, YB. 22 Edw. 1, R.S. 555 (1294) (ravishment of ward);
Anon., Y.B. Pasch. 34 Edw. 1, R.S. 175 (1306) (same); Peverel v. Holbrook, Y.B. Hil.
7 Edw. 2, pl. 7, 39 S.S. 43 (1313) (forfeiture of marriage); Anon., Y.B. Mich. 11 Edw.
2, pl. 54, 61 S.S. 148 (1317) (same); Anon., YB. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 19, 20 S.S. 100
(1310) (waste); Goldington v. Bassingburn, Y.B. Trin. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 27A, 20 S.S. 193
(1310) (conspiracy); Scottow v. Birkeleghe, Y.B. Trin. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 19, 33 S.S. 205
(1312) (account).
76. Anon., Y.B. Trin. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 243 (1304) (writ of right of ward); Champion
v. Havering, Y.B. Hil. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 7, 31 S.S. 27, 173 (1311) (quare impedit).
77. Lavington v. Seymark, Y.B. Hil. 11 Edw. 2, pl. 1, 61 S.S. 152 (1317); Lymesy v.
Abbot of Westminster, Y.B. Trin. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 11, 36 S.S. 31 (1313); Anon., Y.B. 2
Edw. 2, pl. 75, 17 S.S. 150 (1308-1309). Cessavit was a lord's claim for land held by
a tenant who had ceased doing services for two years.
78. Somery v. Burmingeham, Y.B. Mich. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 87, 22 S.S. 198 (1310); Anon.
v. Ersedekene, Cornwall Eyre, Y.B. 30 Edw. 1, R.S. 143, 145 (1302); Anon., 4 Edw. 2,
42 S.S. 165 (1310-1311) (from 2 A. FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT fol.
34, Garraunt des Chartres pl. 29 (1514)); Gentylcors v. Brown, Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2,
pl. 31, 20 S.S. 113 (1310); Fitzanable v. Haket, Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 46, 63 S.S.
230 (1311); Taumbes v. Skegness, Y.B. Pasch. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 11, 31 S.S. 215 (1312). Debt
commanded the defendant to render a sum of money or fungible goods owed to the
plaintiff and unjustly detained, or come to court to explain why not. Covenant
commanded the defendant to keep an agreement with the plaintiff to perform services
or convey specific goods. Trespass ordered the defendant to come to court to explain
why he or she committed a wrong against the plaintiff.
79. Daman v. Abbot of Gloucester, Y.B. Trin. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 23, 36 S.S. 80 (1313).
Cf Maitland, supra note 58, at 217. Annuity commanded the defendant to render a
sum of money or fungible goods in arrears from the annual rent or payment owed to
the plaintiff. On the disappearance of the original connection of annuities to land, see
Milsom, Commentary on the Actions, in NOVAE NARRATIONES, 80 S.S. clxix-clxxii.
80. Anon., Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 40, 20 S.S. 125 (1310); R. v. Prior of Merton,
YB. Mich. 11 Edw. 2, pl. 24, 61 S.S. 84 (1317).
81. Burnet v. Beauchamp, Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl, 13A, 20 S.S. 89 (1310); Mareschal
v. Foliot, Y.B. Trin. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 3A, 20 S.S. 150 (1310); Lavington v. Seymark, Y.B.
Hil. 11 Edw. 2, pl. 1, 61 S.S. 152 (1317) (waste); Somery v. Burmingeham, Y.B. Mich.
4 Edw. 2, pl. 87, 22 S.S. 198 (1310); Anon., 4 Edw. 2, 42 S.S. 165 (1310-1311) (from
2 A. FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT fol. 34, Garraunt des Chartres pl. 29
(1514)) (warranty of charters). See also Anon., CASUS PLACITORUM, 69 S.S. 78 (c.
1272- c. 1278) (naifty "personal" or "of right"). Waste claimed damages (and, by
statute, forfeiture of land) from a temporary holder of land who had altered the land
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to the damage of a future possessor. Warranty of charter commanded a lord to warrant
that the plaintiff held land of the lord according to the terms of the lord's (or his
ancestor's) charter.
82. Anon., CASUS PLACITORUM, 69 S.S. 78 (c. 1272 - c. 1278); Wygketone v. Bishop
of Carlisle, YB. Mich. 31 Edw. 1, R.S. 343 (1303); Anon., 4 Edw. 2, 42 S.S. 165
(1310-1311) (from 2 A. FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT fol. 34, Garraunt

des Chartres pl. 29 (1514)); Comyn v. Monpynson, Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 52, 63 S.S.
247 (1311); Noreis v. Northcott, Y.B. Pasch. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 34, 33 S.S. 76 (1312); Hutton
v. Ludlow, Y.B. Mich. 7 Edw. 2, pl. 41, 39 S.S. 15 (1313) f.f Lavington v. Seymark,
Y.B. Hil. 11 Edw. 2, pl. 1, 61 S.S. 152 (1317) (in waste, the plea is not real, though the
judgment is, by Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 5).
83. R. v. Prior of Merton, Y.B. Mich. 11 Edw. 2, pl. 24, 61 S.S. 84 (1317).
84. E.g., Anon., CASUS PLACITORUM, 69 S.S. 79 (c. 1268

-

c. 1272); Anon. v.

Erskedene, Cornwall Eyre, YB. 30 Edw. 1, R.S. 143, 145 (1302); Burnel v. Beauchamp,
Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 13, 20 S.S. 89 (1310); Midhope v. Prior of Kirkham, YB.
Mich. 7 Edw. 2, pl. 17, 36 S.S. 172 (1313). But see Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 75, 17
S.S. 150 (1308-1309) (cessavit real, though the action accrued by the defendant's own
act).
85. For different reports contradicting each other on the same writ, see, e.g., supra
at nn.65-73. For disputes surfacing in an individual report, see, e.g., Rasen v. Furnival,
Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 49A, 20 S.S. 140 (1310) (formedon in the descender); Twyford
v. Pyrie, Northamptonshire Eyre, Y.B. 3-4 Edw. 3, 97 S.S. 429 (1329-1330) (same);
Villeins of Ewell v. Prior of Merton, Pasch. 8 Edw. 2, pl. 17, 41 S.S. 144 (1315)
(monstraverunt).
86. Bevercote v. Abbot of Rugford, Y.B. Mich. 31 Edw. 1, R.S. 413, 415 (1303)
(parson's quod permittat for common of pasture); Anon. v. Hoyland, YB. Mich. 33
Edw. 1, R.S. 63 (1305) (partition).
87. Abbot of C. v. Earl of Warren, Middlesex Eyre, Y.B. 22 Edw. 1, R.S. 527, 529
(1294).
88. See supra note 69.
89. R. v. Anon., Stafford Eyre, YB. 21 Edw. 1, R.S. 423 (1293) (quo warranto).
90. Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 75, 17 S.S. 150 (1308-1309) (cessavit).
91. Anon., Cornwall Eyre, Y.B. 30 Edw. 1, R.S. 279 (1302) (quo jure); Maltalent v.
Romyley, Y.B. Trin. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 227, 239 (1304) (admeasurement of pasture);
Devereux v. Tuchet, Y.B. Hil. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 18A, 20 S.S. 16 (1310) (entry ad terminum
qui praeteriit); Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 62, 17 S.S. 128 (1308-1309) (replevin); Anon.,
Y.B. Hil. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 59 (1304) (trespass); Wygketone v. Carlisle, Y.B. Mich. 31
Edw. 1, R.S. 343 (1303) (quo jure).
92. Fressingfeld v. Cookley, Y.B. Hil. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 17B, 20 S.S. 13, 15 (1310) (quare
impedit).
93. Bucketon v. Kynelingworth, Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 22, 63 S.S. 76, 77 (1311)
(formedon in the descender).
94. Bernake v. Montalt, Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. lB, 20 S.S. 60, 61 (1310) (quare
impedit).
95. The terminology can be found, still hotly disputed, later in the fourteenth
century. See, e.g., Reskemmer v. Abbot of Beaulieu, Y.B. Mich. 16 Edw. 3, pl. 87, R.S.
571 (1342) (quare impedit); Pole v. Archbishop of York, Y.B. Mich. 8 Rich. 2, Ames
Foundation ed. [hereinafter cited as Ames] 102, 103 (1384) (same); Anon., Y.B. Hil.
12 Rich. 2, pl. 26, Ames 136, 137 (1388) (de curia claudendo).
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96. Quare impedit did appear to settle into the category of writs "of possession"
after 1310, but the other writs remained unsettled.
97. Pleading rules pressured the pleaders to present their single best argument on
behalf of the party employing them and to abandon the rest. Bolland, Introduction, 43
S.S. xi-xiii. Sparring between opposing pleaders on these terms could proceed to issue
without the intervention of the justices. Often the modern reader can know only that
an argument was advanced in particular language (or was recorded as having been
advanced that way), that it drove the opponent to adopt a different line of argument,
or that its proponent was himself driven to abandon it and try another course, with
rarely a definitive pronouncement from the justices. Given the reluctance of the justices
to make definitive rulings, the "law of the case" emerging from pleaders' bluffing and
strategic concessions in individual reports cannot be taken for generally applicable
rules or professional consensus. Sutherland, The Brotherhoodand the Rivalry of English
Lawyers in the General Eyres, 31 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 1, 6-8 (1987).
98. When, however, one's interlocutor was Justice Bereford, such an answer was
not quite enough. Lavington v. Seymark, Y.B. Hil. 11 Edw. 2, pl. 1, 61 S.S. 152, 156
(1317).
99. Molin v. Abbot of Westminster, Middlesex Eyre, YB. 22 Edw. 1, R.S. 339 (1294)
(cosinage).
100. Samuel v. Hopsal, Y.B. Pasch. 8 Edw. 2, pl. 9, 41 S.S. 112 (1315) (besael).
101. Thus, it was enough to say that ael and cosinage were writs of possession and
"savored" of mort d'ancestor. Anon., Middlesex Eyre, Y.B. 22 Edw. 1, R.S. 301 (1294);
Anon., Y.B. Mich. 31 Edw. 1, R.S. 461 (1303).
102. E.g., Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 63, 17 S.S. 130 (1308-1309); Paramore v.
Gedding, Y.B. Mich. 7 Edw. 2, pl. 2, 36 S.S. 92 (1313); Etchingham v. Sandwich, Kent
Eyre, Y.B. 6-7 Edw. 2, 29 S.S. 26 (1313-1314); Welton v. Messager, Northamptonshire
Eyre, Y.B. 3-4 Edw. 3, 98 S.S. 537 (1329-1330). Pleaders tried unsuccessfully to make
the category label a substantive limit on liability by arguing that there were writs of
ael (on grandfather's seisin) and besael (on great-grandfather's), but not of tresael (on
great-great-grandfather's), in order to bar a writ of cosinage (on a collateral relative's
seisin) in which the demandant traced descent through a great-great-grandfather. E.g.,
Kirkeby v. Everyngham, Y.B. Pasch. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 145 (1304); Tremur v. Giffard,
Y.B. Mich. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 62, 34 S.S. 211 (1312-1313); cf Reskemmer v. Abbot of
Beaulieu, Y.B. Mich. 16 Edw. 3, pl. 87, R.S. 571 (1342) (quare impedit).
103. See supra note 27. In Year Book dialogue, "writ of seisin" was a conceivable
label, though rarely applied. See Sagor v. Atte Welle, Y.B. Trin. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 1, 42 S.S.
13, 14 (1311) (ael).
104. See supra at nn.45-46. For Bracton, possession and proprietas could both be
elements of "right" (ius). In the few instances where he did contrast possession with
"right,' e.g., fol. 285b (3:329), Bracton's term is again ius, not the recto of the writ of
right. See also Summa Magna, in RADULPHI DE HENGHAM SUMMAE, supra note 33,
at 40 (proprietaterecti); id. at 47 (proprietatem iuris); Judicium Essoniorum, in FOUR
THIRTEENTH CENTURY LAW TRACTS, supra note 8, at 134 (iure et proprietate).
105. BRITTON, bk. 2, ch. 3, fols. 87, 89b; bk. 2, ch. 8, fol. 101; bk. 2, ch. 11, fol.
106b; bk. 2, ch. 16, fol. 121b; bk. 3, ch. 13, fol. 204; bk. 3, ch. 22, fol. 217; bk. 3, ch.
26, fol. 221b; bk. 4, ch. 3, fol. 226; bk. 4, ch. 6, fol. 233b; bk. 4, ch. 8, fols. 235b-236;
bk. 6, intro., fol. 268 (1:221, 227, 257, 271-72, 311; 2:120, 153-54, 166-67, 178, 203,
209-10, 309); but see bk. 3, ch. 9, fol. 189b; bk. 4, ch. 15, fol. 267 (2:81, 305-306)
(contrasting writs of possession and of right). See also the problematic MIRROR OF
JUSTICES, supra note 73, at chs. 24, 25, 7 S.S. 65, 67 (droit de propriete).
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106. See, e.g., Anon., YB. 21 Edw. 1, R.S. 107 (1293); Rudde v. Hagham, YB.
Mich. 30 Edw. 1, R.S. 31 (1302); Codeston v. Tunbridge, YB. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 16A, 17
S.S. 65 (1308-1309); Thyke v. Fraunceys, YB. Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 48, 63 S.S. 240
(1311); Saunderville v. Driby, YB. Mich. 7 Edw. 2, pl. 32, 39 S.S. 1 (1313); Hermewelle
v. Cambernoun, YB. Mich. 12 Edw. 2, pl. 31, 65 S.S. 42 (1318). Cf Fressingfelde v.
Jonesman, YB. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 50, 17 S.S. 105 (1308-1309) (propretk de la garde).
107. BRIrON, bk. 1, ch. 1, fol. lb (1:3) and passim; FLETA, bk. 1, ch. 1, fol. 4, 72
S.S. 13; bk. 4, ch. 1, fol. 82, 89 S.S. 46, and passim. The untrustworthy MIRROR OF
JUSTICES opened its treatment of actions with the same classification, supra note 73,
at bk. 2, ch. 1, 7 S.S. 43, though when it later divided the writs, they had become real
and personal "sins" (pecchiez), id. at bk. 2, ch. 6, 7 S.S. 49.
108. Fet Asaver, in FOUR THIRTEENTH CENTURY LAW TRACTs, supra note 8, at 53;
T.FT PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 95.
109. Modus Componendi Brevia, in FOUR THIRTEENTH CENTURY LAW TRACTS,
supra note 8, at 53; TET PLUCKNETr, supra note 6, at 143.
110. See, e.g., Goldington v. Bassingbourne, Y.B. Hil. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 10, 31 S.S. 42
(1311). In one case, the reported words of Justice Hervey de Stanton imply that "plea
touching the realty" could be a broader category than "plea of land.' Porteseye v.
Haustede, Y.B. Mich. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 59, 22 S.S. 173 (1310). In another case that term
(found in a different manuscript), the same Justice is quoted contrasting pleas of land
with personal actions. Somery v. Burmingeham, YB. Mich. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 87, 22 S.S.
198 (1310).
111. Collas & Plucknett, Introduction, 70 S.S. xix-xxi. For an argument that
l'entendement de ley required that "reversion" in a deed be read as "remainder," see
Saltmarsh v. Redeness, Y.B. Hil. 10 Edw. 2, pl. 13, 54 S.S. 35, 38 (1317). In 1314 Chief
Justice Bereford opened an address to the jury on a writ of utrum (perhaps in French,
perhaps in English) with the words "This is a writ of right where the mise is joined
on a certain point" and so forth, provoking the response "Sire, we are not lawyers
(gentz de ley)" and a request for further explanation. Abbot of Tewkesbury v. Calewe,
Y.B. Trin. 7 Edw. 2, pl. 1, 39 S.S. 158, 160-61 (1314).
112. On the latter pairing, an exceptionally useful manuscript source is the short
elementary tract Divisiones Brevium, described in Brand, supra note 7, at 163-64. The
tract, represented in several manuscripts in the British Library, appears intended to
explain the common law writs to readers already familiar with some Roman legal
terminology. It begins by introducing the writ "called right" (breve expressum recti),
and contrasts it with writs "of entry" and "of seisin." The predominant category,
however, is that of writs "of possession." Mort d'ancestor, utrum, novel disseisin,
darrein presentment, ael, besael, and cosinage are said to be writs de possessione et
non de proprietate.The newer terminology is also present: Quare impedit is "mixed"
de recto et de possessione. This suggests that the late thirteenth-century learning
surrounding the writ ofquare impedit may hold the clue to the Year Books' opposition
of possession and right. See British Library Additional MS. 22708, fols. 30v-31v;
Harley MS. 1120, fols. 146-49; Harley MS. 1208, fols. 137-39; Lansdowne MS. 467,
fols. 172v-173v; Royal MS. 10.A.v, fols. 147v-149v.
113. T.FT. PLUCKNETT, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I at 14 (1949).
114. Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 40 (voucher to warranty in writs
of possession, of entry, and of right); Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 5
(1285) (writs of advowson of right and of possession). As writs "of possession,"
Westminster I listed mort d'ancestor, cosinage, ael, nuper obiit, intrusion, and other
like writs; Westminster II listed darrein presentment and quare impedit. For applications,
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see Rust v. Banyard, Y.B. Trin. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 249, 251 (1304); Dodingtone v. Anon.,
Y.B. Trin. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 265, 269 (1304); Marmion v. Scoter, Y.B. Pasch. 10 Edw. 2,
pl. 27, 54 S.S. 124, 125 (1317). In contrast, chapter 3 of the Statute of Gloucester,
1278, 6 Edw. 1, applied by its terms to cosinage, ael, and besael, and was not extended
to other writs of possession. Cauville v. Drax, Kent Eyre, Y.B. 6-7 Edw. 2, 29 S.S. 159,
160 (1313-1314) (nuper obiit) (query by reporter); Whittlesey v. Laurence, Y.B. Mich.
8 Edw. 2, pl. 24, 37 S.S. 135, 136 (1314) (entry).
115. The formula bref de possessioun was not entirely uniform; more variants
appeared after 1310. See Bernake v. Montalt, Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. lB, 20 S.S. 60
(1310) (accioun... en la possessioun); Walsham v. Walsham, Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 2, pl.
10, 37 S.S. 52, 53 (1314) (accioun possessorie); Colchester v. Abbot of Colchester, Y.B.
Mich. 8 Edw. 2, pl. 11, 37 S.S. 71, 73 (1314) (precipe de possessioun); Peverel v. Braose,
Y.B. Trin. 8 Edw. 2, pl. 4, 41 S.S. 188, 192 (1315) (accioun en la possessioun); Anon.,
Y.B. Pasch. 10 Edw. 2, pl. 17, 54 S.S. 111 (1317) (play depossessioun).
116. See cases cited supra notes 83 to 85.
117. E.g., Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 75, 17 S.S. 150 (1308-1309) (cessavit); Lavington
v. Seymark, Y.B. Hil. 11 Edw. 2, pl. 1, 61 S.S. 152 (1317) (novel disseisin, waste).
118. E.g., Nota, Shropshire Eyre, Y.B. 20 Edw. 1, R.S. 245 (1292) (default is
peremptory in personal action); Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 75, 17 S.S. 150 (1308-1309)
(no plea of age); Burnel v. Beauchamp, Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 13, 20 S.S. 89 (1310)
(no impleader of codefendant); Anon., Y.B. Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 40, 20 S.S. 125 (1310)
(no exception to variance); Somery v. Burmingeham, Y.B. Mich. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 87, 22
S.S. 198 (1310) (same); Fitzanable v. Haket, Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 46, 63 S.S. 230
(1311) (no aid of lord); Noreis v. Northcott, Y.B. Pasch. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 34, 33 S.S. 76
(1312) (no exception of ancient demesne). Contrary arguments appear in Anon., Y.B.
2 Edw. 2, pl. 62, 17 S.S. 128 (1308-1309) (personal plea abates, surplus co-plaintiff);
Daman v. Abbot of Gloucester, Y.B. Trin. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 23, 36 S.S. 80 (1313) (wager
of law only for personal actions).
119. E.g., Anon., Y.B. Hil. 32 Edw. 1, R.S. 59 (1304) (trespass); Burton v. Lancaster,
Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 133, 19 S.S. 59 (1308-1309) (replevin); Comyn v. Monpynson, Y.B.
Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 52, 63 S.S. 247 (1311) (wardship); Lavington v. Seymark, Y.B. Hil.
11 Edw. 2, pl. 1, 61 S.S. 152 (1317) (waste).
120. Robert Palmer suggests that darrein presentment and the writ of right of
advowson may have been the first writs to be employed successively on a regular basis.
Palmer, The Origins of Property in England, 3 LAw & HIST. REV. 1, 24 (1985).
121. The basic principle can be found variously formulated in, e.g., BRACTON, fols.
103b, 112b, 328 (2:297, 319; 4:47); CASUS PLACITORUM, no. 19, 69 S.S. 4; Warde v. Le
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